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REMARKS
OF
HON. J. H. BROMWELL,
OF OHIO,
ON
HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION,
IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
JUNE 14, 1898.

WASHINGTON.
1898.

P.
Mr. W. A. Smith

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REMARKS
OF
HON. J. H. BROMWELL.

The House having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States—

Mr. BROMWELL said:

Mr. SPEAKER: After thirty years of peace at home and abroad we are to-day in the midst of war's alarm; the drumbeat and the bugle call once more resound throughout the land; gathering hosts are hurrying to the front; Old Glory waves over American soldiers marching in battle array; on our ships of war, more deadly than ever before, the crews stand ready for action; a naval victory, unique in the history of warfare, has placed the name of Dewey with those of Farragut, Decatur, and Nelson, and those of Bagley and Hobson fill the world with admiration.

Another brilliant page is about to be added to the history of American triumph by land and sea over a hostile foe. Our arms are turned no longer against American soldiers and brethren in other States of the Union. The struggle is not maintained, as in the civil war, against the perpetuity of the American Government and the preservation of free institutions. We stand a united people in a united cause for a united purpose, to extend the privileges of liberty to an oppressed people from the cruelty of a country which has for hundreds of years been a disgrace to the civilization of the world, and to avenge an act of barbarism of which no other nation on earth would have been guilty save Spain.

Side by side are the companies and regiments and brigades from the North and South. Northern soldiers will march under WHEELER and Lee, and Southern troops will fight with Miles and Merritt. On the quarter-deck and in the gun rooms of our cruisers and battle ships will stand the men whose homes are on the Gulf with the men whose homes are on the Lakes. We have become a homogeneous people with one aim, one aspiration—the honor and glory of a common country.

Thirty-five years ago the melodies of Dixie went up from one side of the armed fortifications, while the music of the Star Spangled Banner floated upward from the other. To-day the strains of both are heard in every camp and float across the water from every seacoast city on the oceans and the Gulf. In the armies which will ere long be marching through the Cuban Island will be found the children of Southern slaves, the children of their masters and of those who set them free, guided by a common purpose, with a common motto, "Cuba libre."

LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM PRESENT WAR.

From such a war we can not, if we are wise, but draw lessons for our future conduct as a nation. We have slept for thirty years contented with our internal resources, strong in our material growth and development, self-confident to meet any struggle in which we should be called to engage. We have reasoned that our isolation from the great powers of the other hemisphere would continue to be our protection and our strength. We have forgotten the mighty progress which has been made in bringing more closely together the remotest corners of the earth.

With no occasion to demand them, we have failed to keep abreast of the progress of the rest of the world in offensive and defensive preparations for war. While the first little monitor, the product of American invention and genius, has revolutionized naval warfare, we have allowed ourselves to fall behind in our naval equipment until we have ceased to rank among the leaders in the matter of naval strength, and even the antagonism of a sixth-rate power has found us unprepared for immediate action and filled with solicitude for immediate results.

In the advancement of modern military science requiring months of preparation for the emplacement of modern batteries in our sea-coast fortifications and years for the construction of naval vessels and their armament and the manufacture of high-power explosives, we can not afford, in time of peace, to neglect these great works until the call to war shall sound. When the *Maine* was blown up by the Spanish assassins not enough powder and shells were in the hands of the Ordnance Department to fight a single day's battle; not a fortification along the coast was in a condition to sustain the bombardment of a hostile fleet; not a sufficient force of troops, drilled and disciplined for active service, was at the disposal of the General Commanding the Armies for an invasion of Cuba. It has taken more than a hundred days of constant, unremitting, strenuous work to reach the point where we may feel that we are at last prepared for offensive movements. I believe that this lesson will not have to be again repeated to the American people.

In the history of England we read of one monarch, a Saxon king, who, surrounded by foreign foes, by procrastination failed to place his people in a proper condition to meet them, and his reign was a prolonged series of disasters. So conspicuous was this neglect that he has come down to us under the name of "Ethelred the Unready." We have within our own experience seen even modern nations guilty of a similar blunder. France was overrun by Germany, China defeated by Japan, because they had not in time of peace properly prepared for time of war. Pray God that never in our history shall we be found, in a contest with a foreign nation, so unworthy as to be called "The United States the Unready." We have been dangerously near it in the present instance.

True, it costs vast sums of money to provide and maintain a naval armament and a coast defense which will put us on a fair footing of equality with the European powers; but the cost of hurried preparation, the expense of organizing and maintaining a great army called together for an emergency, is far in excess of the outlay which would be required to place ourselves in a state of preparation in times of peace such as would make unnecessary in most, if not all, cases a state of war.

NECESSITY OF COALING STATIONS.

Another lesson which comes home to us is the fact that it would not do for us as a nation to ignore the necessity of acquiring and maintaining in other parts of the world, even though remote from our shores, places of rest and supply for the vessels of our Navy. In the days of Nelson and Decatur, when the wind was the only motive power, cruises of months or years could be made by a naval fleet without the necessity of stopping at a port. But with the introduction of steam and the harnessing of the lightning to perform so many of the functions of a ship of war the usefulness of a fleet or vessel is limited by its capacity to carry its own supply of coal.

However magnificent and almost invulnerable a modern battle ship may seem to be, it becomes a helpless derelict upon the face of the waters when its bunkers are empty of coal and its supply station remote. Were the necessities of our naval service confined to our own immediate waters this would be perhaps a matter of little concern to us, for so long as our mines yield their stored-up treasures and our great railroad systems carry their black but precious loads to our seaboard, our ships of war could supply their needs under the protection of skillfully equipped and well-manned coast defenses. [Applause.]

REVIVAL OF MERCHANT MARINE.

But we should not forget that the hope is cherished that at no remote time in the future the great merchant marine of the United States shall again be rebuilt; that our commerce will be found on every ocean and in every inlet floating on American bottoms; that American citizens will be found either in the pursuit of business or pleasure in every city in every corner of the earth. It will be our duty to spread the protection of this glorious banner of freedom over every American, however humble; over every American vessel, however remote.

To do this will require an American Navy to enforce our just demands and command the respect of even the most powerful nation. We shall build more ships, we shall train more men for this service, we shall make our coasts invulnerable, and we shall rank among the most powerful instead of among the weakest in our military and naval strength. Not for aggression, except in the cause of right; not for oppression or territorial aggrandizement, but for the enforcement of justice to our own people and protection of liberty and free government to the countries of this Western Hemisphere. With this necessity for the promotion of our naval welfare are intimately associated two great subjects which have demanded the attention of the American nation and which the present war will no doubt bring to a fitting conclusion—the annexation of Hawaii and the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal.

NICARAGUAN CANAL.

Their necessity has come home to us as it never could had it not been for the experience of the last three months. The run of our magnificent battle ship, the *Oregon*, through 13,000 miles of water, amidst not only the perils of the sea, but of the danger of attack by a hostile fleet, is a wonderful one in the history of naval warfare. But how many sighs have gone up, how many apprehensions have been felt for her safety and that of her men,

which might have been spared had the shorter route through the Nicaraguan Canal been given her. We are sending relief to the gallant Dewey, adequate, I hope, even should a Spanish fleet be sent to the Philippines to recover those islands.

With the great canal across the isthmus it would be at least an even race and a fair chance for our Atlantic fleet to succor Dewey and his gallant men. We need it for the proper defense of our western coast. We need it for the purpose of obviating the necessity of maintaining at a great expense a double line of naval vessels when with it one alone would be sufficient. We need it to save the delay in sending our vessels from one coast to the other when the loss of a day might mean the destruction of lives and property more precious and valuable than any outlay we may make in its construction. We need it, too, in times of peace as well as in times of war. The great western coast of South America should be the market for the manufactures of the East and the agricultural productions of the South and the great Mississippi Valley.

We need it for the opening trade with the countries of eastern Asia, one day destined to eclipse all the other commerce of the world. We need it in times of war for our defense and in times of peace for our commerce. Before the dawn of the twentieth century I hope and I believe that it will be under way to its completion.

But important as this great enterprise is, we are confronted with the necessity of prompt action upon another far more important from every standpoint and more urgent upon our demands for attention. That subject is the one now under discussion in this House—the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

CONSENSUS OF OPINION OF PUBLIC MEN.

I can hope to add nothing new to the discussion that has occupied the attention and best minds of the country for the last fifty years. The messages of our Presidents; the state papers of our Cabinet officers, our ministers, and our consuls; the professional opinions of our best military and naval experts; the careful study and expression of judgment of leading statesmen of both Houses of Congress, and the editorial utterances of the great press of the country, ever the faithful reflector as well as the mold of the sentiments of the people at large, have united in one general, grand consensus of belief that it is a national duty which we owe to ourselves to annex these islands.

While it is true perhaps that there is a certain amount of sentimentality connected with this belief, arising from the fact that the progress of these islands from a state of paganism to the highest plane of Christian civilization has been due to the efforts of American missionaries; that the development of her magnificent natural resources and the upbuilding of her commerce have been the result of American immigration; that the overthrow of a corrupt and dissolute monarchy and the establishment of a constitutional republican government, modeled largely from the pattern of our own, have been wrought by American sympathizers, there is added to this a practical phase of the question which appeals not only to our self-interest but to considerations of the highest importance affecting our future welfare and protection.

Divorcing, therefore, from our consideration of this subject all questions of mere sentiment, ignoring the fact that American interests dominate and control its affairs, shutting our eyes even to the sympathy which has heretofore existed between the two coun-

tries, and which has made the Government of Hawaii during the present war assume the onerous duties and liabilities of an ally to this country instead of confining herself to the safe bounds of a neutral position, let us look at the question from the hard, practical, selfish, if you will, standpoint of the benefits which will accrue to the United States from this annexation when completed.

Naturally a question of this kind divides itself into a consideration of the positive arguments in favor of the plan and an answer to the objections which are urged against it, but these are so inseparably connected that I shall not attempt to enumerate them as distinct from each other, for the answer to each objection that is raised forms of itself a link in the chain of the argument in behalf of annexation.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.

The first argument in favor of the annexation of these islands is based upon their strategic value for the defense of our Pacific coast growing out of their unique and isolated position in the midst of the great Pacific Ocean and the limitations upon the effectiveness of the modern vessels of war by reason of the absolute necessity of either carrying immense supplies of fuel or of having coaling stations at convenient intervals.

Mahan, in his article in the *Forum* of March, 1893, says:

The military or strategic value of a naval position depends upon its situation, upon its strength, and upon its resources. Of the three, the first is of most consequence, because it results from the nature of things, whereas the two latter, when deficient, can be artificially supplied in whole or in part. Fortifications remedy the weakness of a position, foresight accumulates beforehand the resources which nature does not yield on the spot; but it is not within the power of man to change the geographical situation of a point which lies outside the limit of strategic effect.

Let us examine from this standpoint the unique position of these islands. They stand at the center of a circle within a few hundred miles of whose circumference may be found the most important points on the western coast of the United States, the southern shores of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the eastern coast of Japan and the Polynesian Archipelago. Within easy steaming distance of the coaling stations of European powers in these eastern waters, no other nation on earth would hesitate to acquire possession of them were the opportunity given as it is to the United States. The following table will show their distance from these most important points:

Hawaii to—	Miles.
San Francisco	2,680
Nicaragua Canal	4,210
Tahiti	2,389
Pagapago, Samoa	2,263
Auckland, New Zealand	3,850
Fiji	2,736
Marshall Islands	2,698
Caroline Islands	2,699
Hongkong	4,917
Yokohama, Japan	3,394
Unalaska, Aleutian Islands	2,016
Sitka	3,395
Vancouver	2,395

The location of these islands with respect to the nearest coaling stations of other nations is very concisely but comprehensively stated in the remarks of Mr. Draper, of Massachusetts, in this

House in February, 1891, from which I make the following quotation:

Until 1886 Hawaii was nearer to the territory of the United States than to that of any other power, the distance to San Francisco being but 2,100 miles. While the British fortified port of Victoria, with its neighboring dockyard of Esquimalt and coal mines of Nanaimo, was 2,300 miles distant. The next nearest British port was Leonka, in Fiji group, 2,500 miles distant in an opposite direction.

French territory was 2,380 miles distant at Tahiti; Germany held the Admiralty Islands, distant 3,400 miles; and Spain the Caroline Islands, 2,900 miles distant, and the Ladrões, about 2,900 miles distant.

Since that time Germany has moved up to a distance of 2,068 miles by annexing the Marshall Islands and placing herself in a flanking position on both the South Pacific and trans Pacific trade routes.

France, by the acquisition of the Low Archipelago and the Marquesas Islands, is 2,050 miles distant from Hawaii, on the South Pacific route. Great Britain has advanced from Fiji toward the intersecting point on clearly defined lines, annexing group after group and detached islands when they were in the line of approach, even though uninhabited or without harbors or commercial value, until in 1891 her flag was planted on Johnston Island, 600 miles from Hawaii and the nearest point she can approach to her American territory, unless the next move be the occupation of Hawaii itself.

Hon. Lorin Thurston says:

In the Pacific Ocean from the Equator to Alaska, from the coasts of China and Japan to the American Continent, there is but one spot where a ton of coal, a pound of bread, or a gallon of water can be obtained by a passing vessel, and that spot is Hawaii.

In the necessities of modern naval warfare, the architect is confronted by the three serious problems of formidable armament, invulnerable armor, and coal-carrying capacity, and the nice adjustment of these three elements in such a way as to procure, at the same time, the greatest speed is the one problem which is engaging the attention of naval experts throughout the world. Any one of these three features abnormally developed at the expense of the others impairs the efficiency of the fighting machine.

A battle ship or cruiser with large storage capacity for coal can carry proportionately fewer guns of lighter caliber and with armament more liable to penetration by the modern projectile. So that while she might obtain the advantage of remaining long at sea without recoaling, she would at the same time be at a serious disadvantage in conflict with a vessel carrying heavier armor and throwing a greater weight of projectile to a greater distance. On the other hand, it matters not how impervious her armor or deadly her armament, if she can not carry within herself her means of locomotion, she becomes worthless except for purposes of coast defense.

"A modern battle ship without coal is like a caged lion—magnificent, but harmless."

So unanimous are modern strategists upon the importance of Hawaii as a strategic point that it has been aptly named and universally referred to as "the key of the Pacific." Its importance to the United States as a means of protection to our western coast has attracted the attention of this Government for many years. General Schofield, who visited the islands under the instructions of the Secretary of War in 1872, said:

The Hawaiian Islands constitute the only natural outpost to the defenses of the Pacific coast. In possession of a foreign naval power in time of war, as a depot from which to fit out hostile expeditions against this coast and our commerce on the Pacific Ocean, they would afford the means of incalculable injury to the United States. If the absolute neutrality of the islands could always be insured, that would suffice; but they have not and never could have the power to maintain their own neutrality, and now their neces-

sities force them to seek alliance with some nation which can relieve their embarrassment. The British Empire stands ready to enter into such an alliance, and thus complete its chain of naval stations from Australia to British Columbia. We can not refuse the islands the little aid they need and at the same time deny their right to seek it elsewhere. The time has come when we must secure forever the desired control over those islands or let it pass into other hands. The financial interest to the United States involved in this treaty is very small, and if it were much greater it would still be insignificant when compared to the importance of such a military and naval station to the national security and welfare.

Quoting again from Captain Mahan:

Shut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles—or between 7,000 and 8,000 going and coming—an impediment to sustained maritime operations well-nigh prohibitive. The coal mines of British Columbia constitute, of course, a qualification to this statement; but upon them, if need arose, we might at least hope to impose some trammels by action from the land side. It is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defense of a coast line—of a sea frontier—is concentrated in a single position, and the circumstance renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can.

Admiral Belknap reenforces these opinions in the following language:

A glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual observer the great importance and inestimable value of those islands as a strategic point and commercial center. * * * Not to take the fruit within our grasp and annex the group now begging us to take it in would be folly indeed—a mistake of a gravest character, both for the statesmen of the day and for the men among us of high commercial aims and great enterprises.

OUR PRESENT NEED OF THE ISLANDS.

But we need not depend upon the theoretical considerations which evolve the opinions of these distinguished experts. We are having to-day a practical illustration of the absolute necessity of these islands to the United States in the conduct of the war we are waging against Spain. Not a vessel that we are sending to Dewey's relief could reach him, not a battalion of the troops which are being carried on transports to complete the subjugation of Manila could be landed at that port, if we were deprived of the privilege of obtaining fresh supplies at this great halfway port in the long journey cross the broad expanse of the Pacific. It is not sufficient to say that when the war with Spain is ended there will be little occasion for offensive operations by American fleets and armies in the waters of eastern Asia.

Little did we imagine before the present war that we should find it necessary to carry offensive operations to so remote a point as the Philippines, and it will not do for us to blindly shut our eyes to the possibility of just such future contingencies again arising. We have learned the lesson that in a war with a foreign power we must be prepared for offensive as well as defensive action, and with every European nation stretching out for bases of supply from which their fleets may operate, and already forming a cordon of advanced posts drawing nearer year by year to our Pacific coast, we shall soon be hemmed in on the west as we are now upon the east and south. With Hawaii in our possession we shall be reasonably secure. Without it, and especially in the hands of an unfriendly nation, we have a menace continually threatening us.

I shall not comment upon the importance of these islands to us from a commercial standpoint, although their accession to our control would mean a vast increase in profitable commerce by the investment of American capital and a rapid growth of our merchant marine for handling the trade of these islands. These mere

pecuniary and commercial considerations are so far overshadowed by their importance to us for offensive and defensive purposes that they may be left out of consideration.

SOME OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

And now let us see what are some of the objections to and arguments against the union that is proposed.

The first, and what would be the most serious one if it were tenable, is the claim that such action would be contrary to our own Constitution.

This claim of unconstitutionality proceeds upon the theory that because there is not a distinct grant of power to annex territory, or because the territory is not contiguous, or because the character of its people is not similar to those of the territory now occupied by the United States, we have not the power to act.

ANNEXATION OF TERRITORY ALREADY MADE.

Fortunately these questions are not new and have all been settled by the highest authorities known to our system of government. While it may be true that the Constitution does not, in so many words, refer to our right to annex additional territory, as a matter of fact we commenced such annexation in the very infancy of our Republic and have continued in that policy down to the present time. We have annexed by purchase, we have annexed by treaty, and we have annexed practically by conquest, or by treaty as a result of conquest. We purchased Louisiana in 1803; Florida in 1819; California, New Mexico, and Arizona, in 1849, came to us as a result of the Mexican war; we annexed Texas by joint resolution of Congress in 1844, and bought Alaska from Russia in 1867. We have occupied and practically annexed the Midway Island in the North Pacific, even farther from our coast than the Hawaiian Islands, and the right to make these annexations has been passed upon by the highest constitutional authority in existence, the Supreme Court of the United States.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANNEXATION.

Chief Justice Marshall, in 1 Peters, 542, said:

The Constitution confers absolutely on the Government of the Union the power of making wars and making treaties. Consequently that Government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or treaty.

And this doctrine has been even more recently reaffirmed by the same court in the following words:

The power to acquire territory is derived from the treaty-making power, and the power to declare and carry on war.

The incidents of these powers are those of national sovereignty, and belong to all independent governments.

So much, then, for the objection that because the Constitution does not contain a specific grant of power we have no authority; for we see that this power to annex is a necessary consequence of our existence as a sovereign and independent nation. These decisions would seem to be broad enough to cover equally the other two constitutional objections, even if they were strictly new questions. But here again we have precedents, upon which no questions have been raised, to establish our rights. The objection that Hawaii is not contiguous becomes of little importance when we recall that the greater portion of the magnificent domain of Alaska is more remote from the nearest point of the rest of our

United States territory than is Hawaii and that we are separated from the former by the domain of a foreign government as well as by an equal stretch of ocean, and that the Midway Island and the Aleutian Islands are absolutely detached from contiguous territory. This objection, therefore, fails.

CHARACTER OF INHABITANTS.

That the inhabitants of Hawaii, or at least a majority of them, are of different race and civilization from those of the United States is undoubtedly true; but did not the same objection lie to the inhabitant of all the territory which we have annexed from the beginning? At the time of the Louisiana purchase the Indians far exceeded in number the white inhabitants, and the latter were largely made up of men alien to our civilization, laws, and customs. Alaska contained nothing but a few Indian tribes, Esquimos, and Russian traders. In comparison with these the population of Hawaii would be far more desirable, for they have had the benefit of Christian education and the enlightening influences of commercial intercourse with civilized nations.

The fear that we would not assimilate this population deserves but little consideration in the face of our experience with the immigration from foreign countries and the rapidity with which within one or two generations at the most they become homogeneous with our other citizens. Once in our possession, too, suitable restrictions can be thrown around the further settlement of these islands by the undesirable class of Asiatics who have within the last few years threatened to overwhelm with their numbers the white population.

All other objections to the annexation of these islands seem to be based rather upon the question of the wisdom of the policy than upon the power to annex. One of the most frequently urged objections on this score is that its remoteness from the continental portion of the United States would render it an object of special attack by hostile nations and would entail upon us the necessity of keeping up a much greater navy and of entailing much heavier expenditures in order to protect it in time of war. Neither of these positions is, in the judgment of those best qualified to speak, tenable.

WILL SAVE EXPENSE OF KEEPING UP LARGE NAVY IN THE PACIFIC.

With Pearl Harbor, the only inlet upon any of the islands capable of receiving and protecting a fleet of large war vessels, well defended, and Honolulu, a few miles distant, properly fortified by American soldiers drawn from the Hawaiian residents, a mere handful of men and one or two battle ships or monitors could protect the island against any hostile fleet that might be sent against it. An attack, if made and unsuccessful, would almost necessarily mean the loss of the attacking fleet, for no vessels that could be sent from any other coal-supply station could run to Hawaii, remain any considerable time to make an attack, and then return to the station which it had left. Its coal bunkers would, long before its arrival, be exhausted, and it would be helpless and defenseless against not only a hostile fleet but even the elements themselves.

As to the fear that it would require a greater Navy and entail greater expense to this Government, it would seem to be reasonable that if by maintaining two or three modern vessels of war at

the Hawaiian Islands we can absolutely prevent the approach of hostile fleets from eastern Asia, it would be far less expensive than maintaining a large number of vessels at each of our unprotected points upon the Pacific coast. An ounce of prevention would, in this case, be far better than a pound of cure. Especially does this argument become convincing should the Nicaraguan Canal be constructed and controlled by the United States, for then our vessels in the Atlantic fleet could reinforce our squadron in the Pacific before the vessels of a hostile power could reach Hawaii from any except the nearest outlying station.

It is the opinion of those best qualified to judge that its annexation will obviate the necessity for large expenditures rather than cause them. We have to take care of Hawaii in the sense of not allowing any other nation to occupy it. This doctrine we have affirmed and reaffirmed on many occasions, and it is now recognized and conceded by every nation on earth that we have that right. It is sufficiently within the sphere of the American influence to bring it strictly within the provisions of the Monroe doctrine, and on more than one occasion that doctrine has been invoked to prevent the occupation of those islands by other powers.

If, therefore, we have this responsibility cast upon us, and remembering that in carrying it out we may become involved at almost any time with another nation who finds it necessary to take military possession of them, how much wiser, easier, and less expensive it would be to us were we to exercise this control not as a mere protectorate over a little helpless nation, but as a part of our own independent and sovereign territory.

RIGHT OF HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT TO ACT.

As to arguments which are raised against the project for reasons growing out of the fact that the governing element of the island constitutes but a mere minority of the entire population, that a large number of its people are denied the right of suffrage, and that any proposition to annex should be submitted to a vote of the entire people instead of the Government now in existence, it is sufficient to say that none of these things have been regarded as of any importance in other cases in which we have acquired territory. With the exception of Texas, the consent of these people was neither asked nor received.

The negotiations were conducted with the sovereign authorities controlling the territory. Even in the case of Texas the people themselves did not pass upon the question directly. It is sufficient for us to know, therefore, that there is a stable Government in these islands, which, acting under constitutional provision specifically set forth, has the right to propose and consummate this annexation. This Government has been recognized by every civilized nation not only as *de facto* but *de jure*. It has all the powers of sovereignty, including that of joining the island by cession to a foreign power. This has been universally recognized as a result of conquest and as preliminary to the sale or cession of territory by peaceful means. We are not hampered, therefore, by any question of the power of the Government with which we will deal.

SUMMARY.

The whole situation, therefore, seems to resolve itself into this: There is no constitutional prohibition, but, on the contrary, ample power; as to the policy which should control the Government,

there is no division of sentiment among those who have considered it from the standpoint of strategic necessity; as to its value for commercial purposes, the whole course of our official action, including the negotiation of treaties of commerce and reciprocity, bears evidence. We would need it at the present time as a military necessity, but even in times of peace we shall need it as a resting place for the fleet we shall have to keep in eastern waters and the relief and assistance which our peaceful commerce will need in its long passage across the Pacific.

It comes to us without war, without bloodshed, without a foreign complication, a voluntary donation of its own Government, its own freewill offering. It is asked for by the Administration as a necessity, and I am ready to grant the request.

For my part, I do not fear that we shall depart from the traditional policy of our country of noninterference in the affairs of foreign nations, but I do believe that the surest safeguard against the interference of foreign governments in our affairs will be the enlargement of our naval armament, the procurement of stations scattered at suitable intervals as harbors of refuge and supply, the building of the Nicaraguan Canal, the retention of Puerto Rico as a guard to its entrance, and the annexation of Hawaii as the "Key of the Pacific." [Applause.]

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